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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
WYCOFF CO:JIPANY, INCORPORATED,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Cases Nos.

PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
OF UTAH and ROY HILL, djbja
SEA!fONS TRU·CK LINE,
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Defendants.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS

STATEMENT OF FACTS
While we substantially agree with the plaintiff's
. statement of the evidence relating to the hearing on the
cases involved, we are not in accord with plaintiff's
conclusions with respect thereto. We will therefore
give our version of that part of plaintiff's statement
of facts which is controverted by the defendant.
In referring to the record, the defendant will cite
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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the page num·ber at the lower righthand corner.
The contract entered into hy the Northwestern
Express Company, Inc. with D. W. Harris, Manager
of the Orpheum Theatre, Tremonton, Utah, on April 7,
1947, was executed prior to April 24, 1947, when the
alleged rights of the said Northwestern Express Company, Inc. were reinstated by the Public Service Commission. The plaintiff never did receive authority from
the commission to provide service under this agreement
(R. 147, 148), nor is there any evidence in the record
that the plaintiff ever served D. W. Harris under said
contract.
There was no reason to notify the Northwestern
Express Company, Inc. or its principal stockholder,
Milton Wycoff, of the hearing on defendant Hill's application to serve the Liberty and Orpheum ·Theatres on
Apri116, 1947, as at that time not only had the contracts
previously held by the Northwestern Express Company,
Inc. ceased to exist, but the rights of the company, if
any, had not been reinstated. The date of the reinstatement order was April 24, 1947. Said company had not
been in operation since January 27, 1944. 'There were
no protests filed by plaintiff to either the Public Service
Commission's order of July. 9, 1947, authorizing service
to said theatres by the defendant Hill, or to its order
of January 9, 1948, authorizing the defendant to serve
the Main Theatre in Garland. If plaintiff felt that by
not having received notice of said hearing his rights
were infringed, his remedy was to protest to the com-
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mission and demand that the issues be formally heard.
This was never done.
The lease between ilielba H. Seamons and Roy Hill
provided that the operating rights of the Seamons
Truck Line should he leased to Roy Hill (R. 93). It is
correct that at the time of the execution of said lease
the operating rights were ''contract rights.'' However,
the agreement provided that all operating rights obtained by the lessee, Roy Hill, should revert to the lessor.
The parties interpreted this clause to refer to any
rights acquired by Hill during the term of the lease,
whether contract motor carrier or common motor carrier. ~[elba Seamons, the lessor, testified at the hearing
in support of the defendant's application (R. 106-107).
The application of the defendant filed on May 21, 1948,
for common motor carrier authority (R. 1, Case No.7 410,
Vol. 2) states that "applicant is an individual operating under the name and style of the Seamons Truck
Line. Contract carrier rights are leased from Mrs.
~[elba Seamons,'' which dilly apprised the commission
that he was applying as the lessee of said contract
rights.
While the defendant was serving the Orpheum
Theatre at Tremonton and the Main Theatre at Garland, pursuant to authority from the commission, ,the
ownership of these theatres became vested in the Allied
Theatre Company, of which change the defendant had
no notice until he received a demand from Milton Wycoff,
president of the plaintiff corporation, to give him the
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keys to the theatres because said company had a contract from said Allied Theatre Company. At the time
the Allied Theatres had been in existence "a couple
of months" (R. 154).
The contract obtained by the plaintiff provided
that he would carry double feature fihns for $2.50 (R.
155), which was 50c cheaper than the defendant had
carried such film (R. 52). When the defendant learned
of the plaintiff's contract he secured a new contract
from Jorgenson, president of the Allied Theatres Company, wherein he agreed to carry double feature film
at the reduced rate of $2.50 in order to meet Wycoff's
rate ('R. 54).
The application of plaintiff for common carrier
authority over regular routes from Salt Lake City,
Utah, to the Utah-Idaho line of U.S. Highways 91 and
89, serving the off-route points of Lewiston and Hyrum,
covered the territory in which the defendant Hill was
serving every theatre with the exception of two which
were government owned (R. 39). It is interesting to
note that not one theatre owner from this territory or
the 'Tremonton-Garland area appeared at the hearing
in support of the plaintiff's application for contract
motor carrier authority or common motor carrier authority.
On pag.e 10 of his brief the plaintiff quotes testimony of the defendant Hill from the record to show
the lack of need for a common carrier. The following
testimony on this point should he considered, with the
testimony quoted:
4
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"Q. Now, at the time you obtained temporary
authority to operate as a contract carrier
for the theatres in Tremonton and Garland
in 1947, was any one else delivering film
to those theatres at that time besides the
Express Company?
"A. No.
'' Q.

And your application as lessee of Mrs.
Seamons' operating rights is to serve as a
common carrier all the same people that you
are now serving as a contract carrier~

"A.

That's right.

''Q. Which will increase your responsibility to
the public and subject you further to the
jurisdiction of this Commission~
"A.

That's right.

"Q. In a sense you have been operating as a
common carrier heretofore, have you not~
''A.

Contract carrier.

'' Q.

I say, in a sense you have been operating
as a comm·on carrier~

"A.

That's right.

'' Q.

In that you have been serving all the
theatres in the district in which you propose
to operate~

"A.

That's right."

Mr. McMahon, who appeared in support of plaintiff's application was only one of twelve or thirteen
film distributors operating in Salt Lake City, Utah (R.
130). His testimony in substance was that there were
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times when it was necessary to send out film to theatres
on special trips; that on these occasions he had used
the Wycoff Company and also the defendant Hil'l (R.
130). His testimony on the type of service furnished
by the defendant Hill is quoted verbatim as follows:

"Q. Have you had occasions in times past to have
Mr. Roy Hill make special trips for you~
"A. I believe Mr. Hill made a trip for us last
week to Tremonton.
"Q. And has Mr. Hill ever refused to make a
special trip for you~
''A. Never at any time.
"Q. Have you been satisfied with Mr. Hill's
service in the past for your company~
"A. He has done a very good job ancl he has
made mistakes, like everybody else has made.
'' Q. Have you ever had any eomplaints of Mr.
Hill's service in any of the theatres~
"A. Not any definite complaints. He has had
mistakes happen.
"Q. And Mr. Wycoff has had his~
"A. That's right.
"Q. And by and large, Mr. Hill has done a very
good job for you~
''A. That's right.''
ARGUMENT
Plaintiff's contentions, as set out in his statement
of points, must be considered in the light of Section
76-6-17, U.'C.A. 1943, which provides that the findings
and conclusions of the commission on questions of fact
6
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shall be final and shall not be subject to review. It has
repeatedly been held that in reviewing cases certified
to the court from the Publie S~rvice Commission, t~e
review is limited to ascertain whether or not the commission had before it substantial evidence upon which
to base its decision, and that only in the event that the
commission acted arbitrarily, capriciously or unreasonably, can the order be set aside. Goodrich v. Public
Sen·ice Commission of Utah, 198 Pac. (2d) 975.

I.
THE EVIDENCE JUSTIFIED THE COMMISSION'S
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S CONTRACT MOTOR
CARRIER APPLICATION TO SERVE THE TWO THEATRES
INVOLVED.

The defendant had satisfactorily served the Orpheum
Theatre at Tremonton under a permanent contract carrier permit since July 9, 1947, and had served the Main
Theatre at Garland under permanent contract authority
since January 9, 1948. Before these dates he 'Served
both theatres under temporary permits issued by the
commission and was so serving said theatres when
Milton Wycoff, president of plaintiff corporation, obtained a contract from the Allied Theatre Company
by cutting the prices .for double feature :fihns from
$3.00 to $2.50 per change (R. 54). When Jorgenson,
the president of the Allied Theatres Company, learned
that Hill would meet Wycoff's rate, he gave Hill a
contract (R. 51), indicating that Hill's service had been
satisfactory. It is significant that Jorgenson did not
7
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appear at the hearing in support of plaintiff's application.
The pJairitiff's claim for authority was based upon
contract permit No. 241, issued the Northwestern Express Company, Inc. in 1939, wherein the commission
granted authority to serve contractees who were managing the three theatres at that time. These contracts
had long ceased to exist. The theatres were under a
different ownership when the defendant started serving
them. It is the defendant's contention that when the
contract ceased to be in effect, the authority of the
plaintiff's predecessor to serve the contractees ceased,
as there was no further reason for the authority. Plaintiff's contention that the reinstatement order of April
2'4, 1947, reactivated the right to serve theatres in 'Tremonton and Garland really amounts to an assertion
that a contract carrier's authority is as extensive as
that of a common carrier. If plaintiff's position is correct, the result would be to make every contract carrier
a common carrier, with the right to select only those
customers whom he would serve and to refuse to serve
the public generally. Such a situation certainly would
not henefit the general interest of the public in efficient
service. The common carrier, being left with only the
unprofitable part of the service, would soon be out of
business.
It is interesting to note that although the plaintiff
contends that it is not necessary to petition the commission to serve new contractees after a permit has
once been granted, that in this case he did exactly that

8
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by filing his petition for contract authority. Also, why
did plaintiff obtain a new contract with the Allied
Theatres Company if he felt his rights under the old
contracts were still in existence¥ The commission's
order of April 24, 19±7, reinstating the rights of the
Northwestern Express Oompany, Inc., merely reactivated
those rights still existing and permitted the defendant
to operate over the same routes and with the same
restrictions. Undoubtedly this company had other rights
under suspension which the plaintiff acquired when the
assets were purchased, but the commission could not
reinstate rights based on contracts that were no longer
in existence.
There is no evidence of other contracts secured by
plaintiff with the parties who operated the theatres
covered by the original contracts fil_ed in 1939, after said
reinstatement order of April 24, 1947, as contended on
page 16 of the plaintiff's brief. The commission by its
order denying the plaintiff contract carrier authority,
merely decided that the defendant should continue to
serve the same two theatres of the common carrier that
he had served in the past as a contract carrier. There
are only three theatres to be served in the Garland and
Tremonton area, and the commission, by its order,
determined that the interests of these theatre operators
could best be served by one common carrier than by
two contract carriers. If plaintiff's petition to serve
two of the theatres had been granted, the defendant still
would have heen required to serve the one theatre that
had not contracted with the plaintiff, the result of which
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would compel him to serve the same territory with a
two-thirds decrease in the available business and resulting loss of revenue, which would eventually cause defendant to discontinue entirely his service to the Tremonton and Garland area.
The commission, in the interest of the general public,
may regulate contract carriers to the same extent as
it does common carriers (Sec. 76-5-24, U.C.A. 1943).
In the case of Goodrich v. Public Service Commission,
supra, this court refused to set aside an order of the
commission denying the carrier authority to serve four
additional contractees who appeared at the hearing
in support of the carrier's petition, upon the ground
that such would result in financial loss to the existing
common carrier, to the detriment of the welfare of
the public in the area to be served. This decision is
also authority that a contract carrier is not authorized
to serve additional contractees upon securing a contract,
but must also petition the commission for authority to
furnish such additional service.

II.
THE COMMISSION ACTED LEGALLY IN GRANTING
COMMON MOTOR CARRIER AUTHORITY TO THE DEFENDANT, WHO WAS LESSEE OF THE OPERATING RIGHTS,
AND MELBA SEAMONS.

There is nothing in the Utah statutes defining the
power of the Public Service Commission stating that a
lessee of contract authority cannot apply for common
carrier authority. The commission permitted the defen-
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dant to lease the operating rights of :.Melha Seamons
under a five year contract on April 15, 1947. There was
some attempt at the hearing on the part of plaintiff
to becloud the issues by asserting that Roy Hill was
applying for common carrier authority in his own name,
to the detriment of the lessor, :Jfelba Seamons. However,
this contention was answered when Mrs. Seamons appeared as a witness in support of her brother's petition.
The lease contract between her and the defendant is no
concern of the plaintiff. The only issue before the
commission was whether or not granting common carrier
authority to the defendant was in the public interest,
which it decided in the affirmative. Mrs. Seamons stated
that she favored the granting of defendant's petition
(R. 106-107). At the end of the lease, if it is not renewed, this authority would revert to the lessor, subject
to the approval of the commission. The public is adequately protected by the statutory power of the commission to revoke the operating rights of any carrier
when the public welfare requires it.
The evidence established that the commission was
within its authority in granting defendant's petition
to operate as a common carrier. Granting that plaintiff
is correct in its assertion that there were no witnesses
who testified on the need for a common carrier, there
were also no protestants, other than the plaintiff, who
were interested as a petitioner for the same authority.
The situation here is different from that in McCarthy
v. Public Service C01nmission, 184 Pac. (2d) 220, wherein
the Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Company,
11
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an existing common carrier, protested the granting of
common carrier authority to a number of independent
truckers, who had previously operated as contract carriers of gravel. In this case the evidence is conclusive
that the defendant served every theatre in the territory
which he proposed to serve as a common carrier, other
than two government owned theatres (R. 39), whereas
plaintiff served no theatres in this territory (R. 151).
There were no complaints on service from any shipper
served by the defendant. The only witness who appeared
at the hearing was Mr. McMahon, and his testimony
was as favorable toward the defendant as it was toward
the plaintiff (R. 131). At the hearing Mr. Wycoff did
say that every exchange manager in Film Row would
testify in support of his petition (R. 140), hut Mr.
McMahon was the only one who appeared.
The principal reason the plaintiff gave in support
of its contention that it was 'better qualified to operate
as a common carrier than the defendant Hill was that
it had more trucks operating than defendant; that it
operated five regular schedules north out of Salt Lake
City, Utah in interstate commerce; that occasionally it
was necessary for plaintiff to make special trips to haul
film to territories served by the defendant; however,
Mr. Wycoff had no records of such special service ('R.
171). The defendant Hill testified that he was in a
position to make special trips when necessary and had
done so in the past ( R. 89).
Defendant contends that under the situation exist-
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ing, wherein he was satisfactorily serving every theatre
as a contract carrier in the territory, which he petitioned
to serve as a common carrier, that the general
public is better served by him as a common carrier than
as a contract carrier. As a common carrier he has a
mandatory duty to serve the public generally instead
of just those individuals with whom he has contracts.
Also, as a common carrier, he must submit to more
detailed tariff regulation by the commission, which is
in the public interest, particularly when his operation
serves every privately owned theatre in northern Utah.
There is very little difference in the requirements
to obtain a certificate of convenience and necessity to
operate as a common motor carrier (see Sec. 76-5-18,
U.C.A. 1943) and the requirements to operate as a contract motor carrier (see 8ec. 76-5-21, U.C.A. 1943, as
amended by Section 3, Chapter 105, page 209, Laws of
Utah 1945). In the former, the commission must he
satisfied with the applicant's financial ability to render
this service. In the latter this requirement is lacking.
1

There was no claim by plaintiff that defendant's
financial ability to serve as a common carrier was insufficient. Therefore, it would seem that if the defendant
were qualified to act as a contract motor carrier, that
he was qualified to serve as a common motor carrier and
the commission felt that the public would benefit, if he
were granted common motor carrier authority. The
evidence was that the plaintiff had forty-two trucks,
thirty-eight to forty-two employees, and carried nearly
13
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all the film from Salt Lake City to Southern Utah (R.
138, 139). Granting it common carrier authority in
Northern Utah would result in plaintiff orbtaining a
virtual monopoly on the carriage of all film in the state
of Utah, which, we submit, is not conducive to the best
interests of the public generally.
Mr. Wycoff's contention that his company desires
authority only to serve theatre owners in Northern Utah
in time of emergencies is a subterfuge by which he hopes
to eventually take over the operations of the defendant.
If plaintiff's petition for common carrier authority is
granted, the defendant can expect the type of competition shown by plaintiff when he cut-rates to the Allied
Theatre Company to obtain a contract from it.
CONCLUSION
The defendant respectfully submits that there
was sufficient evidence to sustain the order of the
commission granting common motor carrier authority
to the defendant and denying the petition of the plaintiff
for such authority, that the order of the commission
denying authority to the plaintiff to operate as a contract carrier to the theatres in Tremonton and Garland
should likewise he affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
STEWART, CANNON & HANSON
AND E. F. BALDWIN, J R.,
1

Attorneys for Defendants.
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